In 1824, the United States was emerging from the period of the so-called “Era of Good Feelings” during the James Monroe Presidency where there was a relative de-emphasis on party politics thanks to the Democratic-Republican Party more or less existing unchallenged during this time. But the good feelings were about to be gone, and a new era was rising where party politics would be tripled down on giving us the seeds of modern day politicking. On the one side was the decidedly hot tempered Andrew Jackson who had only 18 years before illegally killed a man in cold blood for calling him a “worthless scoundrel, … a poltroon and a coward” but got away with it because, the past everybody. More on this in the Bonus Facts later. An orphan and perceived to be a man of the people, Jackson stood in stark contrast to the presidential candidates of yore in the country who largely came from either elite backgrounds or were groomed into politics from a young age.

Speaking of that, on the other side was John Quincy Adams. Quite literally groomed from childhood to become President someday, with his father, one-time President John Adams even writing to a young John Quincy Adams in 1794, “You come into Life with Advantages which will disgrace you, if your success is médiocre.— And if you do not rise to the head not only of your Profession but of your Country it will be owing to your own Laziness Slovenliness and Obstinacy.”

Yet a rather curious thing happened during the election of 1824. Andrew Jackson would go on to win not just the popular vote, but the electoral college, with Adams finishing well behind him on both in second place. And yet Adams, the inside man with friends in high places, was made President and Jackson nearly a footnote to history… That is, until an anonymous letter was published in the Philadelphia Columbian Observer that claimed Adams had made a secret deal with the speaker of the House Henry Clay such that if Clay would use his influence on the House to make him President, Adams would, in turn, make Clay the Secretary of State.

For context here, at the time, Secretary of State was the defacto office to have if one wanted to themselves become President someday. In fact, after the first and second Presidents in George Washington and John Adams, every President up to this 1824 election had previously served as the Secretary of State, and it was also the position John Quincy Adams presently held when he ran for President in this election.

What followed was a scandal that changed the course of United States history, helping to see Adams’ Presidency be largely ineffective and Henry Clay’s formerly insanely bright prospects at the nation’s highest office dashed, with his reputation among the general public forever sullied then and still pretty much to this day. This also saw Andrew Jackson’s star shining even brighter, with the scandal helping the otherwise largely unqualified and remarkably unstable Jackson to dethrone Adams in the next election.

But did the supposed bastion of puritanical ethics and rigidly moral to a fault John Quincy Adams, who very publicly vehemently opposed the spoils system, to the point that he even retained many officials in his administration from the previous who actively opposed and thwarted some of his efforts as President, truly throw off his normal extreme and well documented precepts and morals in his quest for the Presidency by making such a shady deal to rob the people of the United States of their chosen President?

Or was the whole thing just a 19th century viral conspiracy theory that blew up to change the course of history?

Well let’s dive into it, shall we, because this one is super fascinating.

Going back to the Presidential election itself, this was a rather unique one in the history of the nation even up through today. Most prominently because all the top men running were from the same party.

As to how this happened, as a result of this quasi-one party system, dissension began to rise markedly within the party ranks during Monroe’s presidency. The result was that when the congressional caucus nominated Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford and Albert Gallatin for their choice of next President and Vice President, many within the party said, “Ya, no thanks,” with only 66 of the 240 Democratic Republican members even bothering to attend the caucus. Further, Gallatin himself had no interest in being Vice President and withdrew, with North Carolina Senator Nathaniel Macon taking his spot. Soon others entered the fray, with the field settling in at: Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, and Senator and General Andrew Jackson- all Democratic Republicans.

Noteworthy very quickly Calhoun dropped out after it was clear he had no shot, but both Jackson and Adams and supporters quickly targeted him as their choice for Vice President, despite that Calhoun was in extreme opposition to many of Adams’s policies.

As for the original choice in Crawford, while he was the chosen candidate by the party technically, he ended up largely being a non-factor owing to having suffered from a stroke leading up to the election.

Then there was Andrew Jackson. From rather humble origins, the son of Scots-Irish immigrants and ultimately orphaned at the age of 14 owing to the Revolutionary War, Jackson’s rise from here would be relatively rapid. He began his ascent by studying law, then ultimately becoming a prosecuting attorney in the region of North Carolina that would become Tennessee. From here, he became attorney general of the Mero District, then judge-advocate for the militia, and then a land speculator after the so-called land grab act of 1783 which opened up Cherokee and Chickasaw territories to white residents. Now wealthy and quite prominent in his region thanks to the displacement of the Natives and now with a large plantation and purchasing over 300 slaves to do the work on it, he became a congressman, later Senator, as well as a major general in the Tennessee militia. The pinnacle of his pre-presidential career and which vaulted him into nationwide fame was his exploits in the War of 1812, and in particular during the Battle of New Orleans. Jackson also garnered further public popularity due to his efforts leading up to the presidential election that saw tens of millions of acres of land ceded from Native Americans to the United States. A general measure he’d later double down on during his own Presidency with the Indian Removal Act, which not only helped bolster his popularity even more… well, among the non-Native Americans of the nation anyway… but also saw another 170,000 square miles of land acquired from the various tribes, with its members forcibly relocated elsewhere by Jackson and his cohorts. As for his justification to critics on this, Jackson wrote, “What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?”

Going back to before the 1824 election, Jackson’s pre-presidential exploits all saw him as one of the most popular men in the nation, and perhaps unsurprisingly from being perceived as a man of the people, the only candidate to garner relatively significant popular votes beyond his home region.

Of course, then there was Jackson’s legendary temper and personal exploits on that front, some of which would occasionally get him into hot water. For example, on May 30, 1806, when he killed famed marksman Charles Dickinson owing to the fact that Dickinson had insulted Jackson in, among other ways, calling Jackson’s wife a bigamist. Which, to be fair, she was, owing to still being married to her former husband when Jackson married her. In the end she ended up having to marry Jackson twice because of this, the second time once her divorce with her former husband, Captain Lewis Robards, was official. More on this killing in the Bonus Facts later.

Noteworthy later when Jackson was in his second term as President, he would also exhibit this temper in spades at times, such as once almost beating a man, one Richard Lawrence, to death on January 30, 1835. At the time Jackson was attending a funeral when Lawrence, who believed himself to be King Richard III of England- note King Richard III had died 350 years before- decided to try to kill Jackson. Lawrence also believed that if he killed Andrew Jackson, the government would give him money they owed him. He intended to use the money to go to England and assume his rightful place on the throne… However, when Lawrence pulled a gun on Jackson it misfired. Rather than duck for cover or flee, Jackson charged Lawrence and beat him with his cane, with reports being that Jackson continued to beat him after Lawrence had been subdued, ultimately having to be pulled away from the would-be assassin lest he beat him to death.

Speaking of beating people to death, Jackson also once published in the Tennessee Gazette offering anyone who found one of his runaway slaves, to quote, “ten dollars extra, for every hundred lashes any person will give him” up to 300 lashes. Note, that amount would likely have been fatal. In another instance, when one of his slaves named Betty was deemed to have behaved improperly in one instance, and thus he ordered his overseer that she “must be ruled with the cowhide”. And that, further, if she ever stepped out of line again, to give her 50 lashes.

John Quincy Adams, however, couldn’t have stood more in contrast in some ways to Jackson. As you might expect, Jackson’s support base was heavily entrenched in the slave states, while John Quiny Adams’ was noted to be, according to one contemporary southerner, the “acutest, the astutest, the archest enemy of Southern slavery that ever existed” owing to his extreme opposition to slavery, which he ultimately dedicated the latter half of his life to, from his pro-bono defense of the captives of the Amistad before the Supreme Court, to pushing the Declaration of Independence and its “all men are created equal” stance as a defining document for the nation, in all otherwise laying much of the groundwork for what Lincoln and his supporters would pick up almost immediately after Adams’ death.

Going back to the contrast in their personal lives, while his father, John Adams, had come from more or less middle class origins before rising to the the Presidency, thanks to the shrewd financial investment efforts of Abigail Adams, John Quincy Adams was raised relatively affluent and, as noted, unlike Jackson was groomed from a young age for the nation’s highest office, with every advantage in education and training for it that the world could possibly offer.

Beyond the previously quoted letter from John Adams to his son about it, his mother, Abigail, also wasn’t messing around when it came to her high expectations for her son because of his privilege. For example once writing John Quincy when he’d just completed a risky trip across the big blue at the age of 10, “For dear as you are to me, I had much rather you should have found your grave in the ocean you have crossed… rather than see you an immoral profligate or a graceless child.” She also would later write to him, “How unpardonable would it have been in you, to have been a Blockhead.”

Thanks mom.

The senior Adams would also write on December 28, 1780 to his son who had apparently recently taken up ice skating, that even in this he should endeavor to excel, writing, “as your Constitution requires vigorous Exercise, it will not be amiss to spend some of your Time in swimming, Riding, Dancing, Fencing and Skaiting, which are all manly Amusements, and it is as easy to learn by a little Attention, to perform them all with Taste, as it is to execute them in a slovenly, Awkward and ridiculous Manner…” And on this point, “Every Thing in Life should be done with Reflection, and Judgment, even the most insignificant Amusements. They should all be arranged in subordination, to the great Plan of Happiness, and Utility. That you may attend early to this Maxim is the Wish of your affectionate Father.”

And attend to this John Quincy did. With his natural genius, pressure from his parents to excel and work hard, in combination with proper training and guidance from those parents, along with access to the best schools and tutors, and getting to spend the years from 10-17 roaming around Europe rubbing elbows with some of the most distinguished people of the era, all forged a young man whose brain few men of his age could match, with his qualifications for the office of President unparalleled in his era.

On this note, starting at just 14, John Quincy began serving his country as secretary and translator to famed American diplomat Francis Dana in St. Petersburg, then on to attending Harvard, practicing law, serving as a U.S. Ambassador in various posts in Europe, a Senator, a Professor at Harvard and Brown, nominated, but turned down, the position as a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, and finally became Secretary of State under President Monroe, where he was one of the key architects of the famed and rather world shaping Monroe Doctrine. He also negotiated the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 that, among other things, gave the U.S. Florida and set the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico. In 1818 he also helped square away the northern border of the U.S. from Minnesota to the Pacific Ocean, and in all his work here generally ranked as the greatest Secretary of State in U.S. history.

As former Managing Editor of The Adams Family Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society, Margaret A. Hogan, would sum up Adams’ work as Secretary of State, “As a diplomat, he set the essential marks of American foreign policy for the next century: freedom of the seas, a halt to further European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, continental expansion, reciprocal trade, and isolationism from European affairs. His formidable skills as an international diplomat ushered in two generations of peace with Europe.”

Needless to say, his entire life had been leading up to the nation’s highest office. And in 1824 it was finally his time to take a crack at the job.

Speaking of that, when the election finally commenced from October 26 to December 2, 1824 and the results tallied, the election stood at Jackson with 99 electoral college votes and 151,271 popular votes. Adams with 84 electoral and 113,122 popular votes. Crawford at 41 and 40,856 votes. And Clay at 37 and 47,531 votes.

As for Vice President, Calhoun dominated thanks to getting votes from supporters of all candidates, with 99 electoral college votes from Jackson supporters, 74 from Adams, 2 from Crawford, and 7 from Clay, for a total of 182 vs the second place finisher the aforementioned Nathaniel Macon at 24.

But as for the Presidency, none of the candidates had achieved the necessary number of electoral votes to win, meaning from here, thanks to the 12th Amendment, the House of Representatives was going to choose the President, and the Senate the Vice President, with their choice, at least, clear in Calhoun. Many also thought the choice of President was clear given Jackson had won both the popular and electoral college votes by a good margin. But it turns out there was a lot more nuance here than meets the eye.

In the first place, Jackson didn’t actually win in the way most people today think. You see, Jackson’s supporters were largely centered in the slave states, meaning he was taking heavy advantage of the 3/5 compromise. In a nutshell, this compromise was the result of the slave states wanting to count the individuals they held as slaves in their population with regards to factors such as number of seats in the House of Representatives and electoral college votes and the like, despite the fact that those individuals forced into slavery couldn’t vote themselves. On the other side, the slave states did NOT want to have their slave populations counted when it came to taxation of their states. Ultimately a middle ground was decided upon wherein 3/5 of the slave population of these states would count in these matters, giving the slave states extra seats in congress and in the electoral college, while reducing their tax bill slightly from what it would be if all the total slave population was accurately represented.

Thus, if you remove the extra electoral college votes that were the result of this 3/5 compromise from all the candidates, the total stood at 83 for Adams and 77 for Jackson.

Nevertheless, the rules were the rules and technically Jackson did have more electoral college votes than Adams under the law of the land at the time and so many thought he was a shoe-in for the Presidency. However, also under the law of the land at the time, it didn’t matter what votes anyone had received at this point. The House was free to choose any among the top three finishers in the Presidential voting with no regard to popular or electoral college vote if they chose not to. Further, in this voting, every state only got 1 total vote, meaning Jackson would no longer get any boost from most of his supporting states having more Representatives because they were getting to count 3/5 of their slaves.

Also noteworthy, had the 3/5 Compromise not existed, it would have been Clay that finished 3rd, not Crawford, which would have changed the game completely when the House took to voting given Clay’s popularity and position there as Speaker of the House, and how his influence helped get Adams elected.

This all brings us back to Henry Clay, who, with several states just supporting him in the election and that position as Speaker, was now in the greatest position to influence the outcome of events.

Clay states of all this, “Everybody professed to regret, after I was excluded from the house, that I had not been returned to it. I seemed to be the favorite of everybody. Describing my situation to a distant friend, I said to him ‘I am enjoying, while alive, the posthumous honors which are usually awarded to the venerated dead’… None made more or warmer manifestations of these sentiments of esteem and admiration, than some of the friends of General Jackson. None were so reserved as those of Mr. Adams; under an opinion (as I have learned since the election), which they early imbibed, that the western vote would be only influenced by its own sense of public duty; and that, if its judgment pointed to any other than Mr. Adams, nothing which they could do would secure it to him….”

But which way did Clay’s judgment point?

The problem for Clay was that he reportedly didn’t like any of the candidates, stating of Jackson in a letter to one Francis Preston Blair on January 29, 1825, “I cannot believe that killing 2,500 Englishmen at New Orleans qualifies for the various, difficult, and complicated duties of the Chief Magistracy.” On the other hand, there were arguably exceptionally few more qualified men in the nation than Adams, but Clay also had several issues with Adams’ politics. That said, Clay’s general policies with his “American System” were much more closely aligned with Adams’s political ideas. Moving over to Crawford, Clay’s American System was significantly opposed with Crawford’s policies. On top of this, Crawford was, in Clay’s view, in no shape at that time to be president owing to the aforementioned stroke he’d suffered in September of 1823.

At first, Clay would hold his cards relatively close to his chest on who he would choose, publicly at least, though his ultimate choice always seemed clear. But before he made it more public, he first met with John Quincy Adams for a few hours, just the two of them, on January 9, 1825. We’ll get into Adams’ journal account of what the pair discussed in that soon to be infamous meeting later on. But for now, shortly thereafter, Clay would declare for Adams and begin to heavily advocate for him among Clay’s previous supporters and beyond leading up to the day of voting on February 9.

It was on that snow covered day in Washington that the votes were cast, with, as noted, each state getting 1 vote, with that singular vote determined by the individual votes of the states’ respective delegates. The victor in the race needed at least 13 votes, lest the process would be repeated.

The result? Adams received 13 votes or 54%, Jackson got 7 votes or 29%, and Crawford got 4 or 16%.

John Quincy Adams was now to be president like his father before him.

While this result shocked the Jackson supporters of the nation, they were even more incensed a few weeks later when Henry Clay was announced as John Quincy Adams’ choice for secretary of state. You see, on January 28th, 12 days before the February 9th vote, a letter was published in the Philadelphia Columbian Observer predicting that this was exactly what was going to happen. The anonymously written letter claimed Clay had given his vote and the votes of his constituents to Adams as a result of Adams promising to award Clay the office of Secretary of State in order to help Clay’s future efforts to ascend to the office of Presidency. In a nutshell, with the accusation, now seemingly confirmed, being that Clay had sold the office of the Presidency to the highest bidder. Specifically the letter stated,

“I take up my pen to inform you of one of the most disgraceful transactions that ever covered with infamy the republican ranks. Would you believe that men, professing democracy, could be found base enough, to lay the ax at the very root of the tree of liberty! … I shall, therefore, at once proceed to give you a brief account of such a Bargain, as can only be equalled by the famous Burr conspiracy of 1801. For some time past, the friends of Clay have hinted that they, like the Swiss, would fight for those who pay best. Overtures were said to have been made by the friends of Adams to the friends of Clay offering him the appointment of secretary of state for his aid to elect Adams. And the friends of Clay gave the information to the friends of Jackson, and hinted that if the friends of Jackson would offer the same price, they would close with them. But none of the friends of Jackson would descend to such mean barter and sale…. I was of opinion, when I first heard of this transaction, that men, professing any honorable principles, could not, nor would not, be transferred, like the planter does the negreos, or the farmer does his team of horses…. We believed the republic was safe. The nation having delivered Jackson into the hands of Congress, backed by a large majority of their votes, there was in my mind no doubt that Congress would respond to the will of the nation, by electing the individual they had declared to be their choice [Jackson]. Contrary to this expectation, it is now ascertained to a certainty that Henry Clay has transferred his interest to John Quincy Adams. As a consideration for this abandonment of duty to his constituents, it is said and believed, should this unholy coalition prevail, Clay is to be appointed secretary of state. I have no fear in my mind. I am clearly of opinion, we shall defeat every combination. The force of public opinion must prevail, or there is an end of liberty.”

Such anonymous letters and even forged documents and sometimes bizarre accusations were nothing new for this particular presidential year, with one such even accusing the famously poorly dressed John Quincy Adams of going to church barefoot and not wearing any underwear. Note, Adams would state this, at least, was incorrect. But of his oft’ lamented general style, he stated in a letter to his future wife Louisa while courting her, “the tailor and the dancing master must give me up, as a man of whom nothing can be made.”

However, this particular accusation against Clay seemed to carry some weight, purporting to be from a member of Congress itself.

Clay wasted no time firing back, disputing the allegations in an article published in the Daily National Intelligencer on February 1, where he also demanded the anonymous author reveal himself, stating at the end of his rebuttal about the matter,

“I believe it to be a forgery; but if it be genuine, I pronounce the member, whoever he may be, a base and infamous calumniator, a dastart, and liar; and if he dare unveil himself, and avow his name, I will hold him responsible, as I here admit myself to be, to all the laws which govern and regulate men of honor.”

Two days later, he got his response in the Intelligencer.

“George Kremer, of the house of representatives, tenders his respect to the Honorable “H. Clay”, and informs him, that, by reference to the editor of the “Columbian Observer”, he may ascertain the name of the writer of a letter of the 25th…, which, it seems, has afforded so much concern to “H. Clay”. In the meantime, George Kremer holds himself ready to prove, to the satisfaction of unprejudiced minds, enough to satisfy them of the accuracy of the statements, which are contained in that letter, to the extent that they concern the course and conduct of “H. Clay.” Being a representative of the people, he will not fear to “cry aloud and spare not,” when their rights and privileges are at stake.”

That said, despite Kremer coming forward here to claim authorship of the letter, it should be noted that he allegedly would later slightly recant on this point, at least according to several other congressman such as Governor Kent, Col Little, and Col Brent of Louisiana claiming Kremer would explicitly state to them the letter was simply given to him to transmit, and that he was, to quote, “not acquainted with its contents, that is, did not comprehend the import of its terms.”

Whatever the truth of that, the rumor mill and, indeed, Clay himself would a couple months later come to believe that the real author was one of Andrew Jackson’s close confidants and biographer, fellow Tennessee Senator John Eaton.

It was also noted that just before the accusation by Kremer was published, Eaton had a meeting with Kremer, which when Clay heard of it, he wrote Eaton to ascertain the truth about it, stating

“I did believe, from your nocturnal interview with Mr. Kremer… that you prepared or advised the publication of his card in the guarded terms in which it is expressed. I should be happy, by a disavowal on your part of the fact of the interview. or of its supposed object, to be able to declare- as in the event of such disavowal, I would take pleasure in declaring- that I have been mistaken in supposing, that you had an agency in the composition and publication of that card.”

Rather than deny any of it, Eaton simply replied on March 31, 1825, “You will excuse me from making an attempt to remove any belief, which you entertain upon this subject. It is a matter which gives me no concern… Suppose the fact to be, that I did visit him; and suppose, too, that it was, as you have termed it, ‘a nocturnal visit;’ was there anything existing, that should have denied me this privilege?”

Going back to the day of the original accusation, Clay didn’t just write a response for the papers, but also brought the matter up to Congress itself, requesting an investigation into his own guilt or innocence in the affair. With the minutes of the day stating,

“The speaker [Mr. Clay] rose from his place, and requested the indulgence of the house for a few moments, while he asked its attention to a subject, in which he felt himself deeply concerned. A note had appeared this morning in the National Intelligencer, under the name, and with the authority, as he presumed, of a member of this house from Pennsylvania, which adopted, as his own, a previous letter, published in another print, containing serious and injurious imputations against him, and which the author avowed his readiness to substantiate by proof. These charges implicated his conduct, in regard to the pending presidential election. …if they were true, if he were capable, and base enough to betray the solemn trust, which the constitution had confided to him; if, yielding to personal views and considerations, he could compromise the highest interest of his country, the house would be scandalized by his continuing to occupy the chair with which he had been so long honored in presiding at its deliberations, and he merited instantaneous expulsion… if guilty, here the proper punishment might be applied; and if innocent, here his character and conduct might be vindicated. He anxiously hoped, therefore, that the house would be pleased to order an investigation to be made into the truth of the charges…”

Ultimately a committee was created consisting largely of political opponents of Clay in P.P. Barbour, Daniel Webster, Louis McLane, John W. Taylor, John Forsyth, Romulus M. Saunders, and Christopher Rankin.

Things from here got rather serious for Kremer and anyone involved on the other side as well with the general sentiment of Congress seemingly summed up by John Wright of Ohio, “Let us investigate these charges; and if they are found true, I have no hesitation in saying, your speaker is unworthy the station he fills, or a seat on this floor; and I, for one, will vote for his expulsion, as I would the member that should falsely make the charge.”

Now in rather hot water, Kremer at first rose to the challenge, stating according to the minutes, “If, upon investigation being instituted, it should appear that he had not sufficient reason to justify the statements he had made, he trusted he should receive the marked reprobation, which had been suggested by the speaker. Let it fall where it might he was willing to meet the inquiry, and abide by the result.”

But then a funny thing happened when the committee subsequently called on Kremer to testify about what he was basing his accusations against Clay off of. He suddenly recanted his former willingness to provide evidence, and very starkly refused. Writing a letter to the committee on February 8,

“Gentlemen: I have received your note of yesterday, in which you inform me, that you will meet at 10 o’clock this morning, and wil there be ready to receive any evidence or explanation, I may have to offer… Placed under circumstances unprecedented, and which I believe not only interesting to myself but important as connected with the fundamental principles of our government, I have reflected with much deliberation, on the course, which duty to myself and my constituents required me to adopt. The result of this reflection is that I cannot, consistently with a proper regard to these duties, assent to place myself before your committee in either of the attitudes indicated in your note…. I can not perceive any principle of power in the constitution, which can give the house of representatives and consequently a committee created by it, jurisdiction over me as the writer of that letter. It neither involves a question of contempt of the house, nor an impeachment of an officer of the government under the constitution; and I can discover no authority by which the house can assume jurisdiction in the case…. I have determined, under a deep sense of duty to myself and my constituents, not to submit to a procedure fraught with such dangerous consequences. I therefore protest most solemnly against the assumption of any jurisdiction, either by the committee or the house of representatives, that shall jeopardize my right to communicate freely to my constituents whatever I may believe necessary for the public good…”

As for the committee members, after Kremer’s refusal to corroborate his accusation and finding no other evidence in support of it, they simply stated, “In this posture of the case, the committee can take no further steps. They are aware, that it is competent to the house, to invest them with power to send for persons and papers, and by that means to enable them to make any investigation, which might be thought necessary and if they knew any reason for such investigation, they would have asked to be clothed with the proper power; but not having, themselves, any such knowledge, they have felt it to be their duty only to lay before the house, the communication, which they have received.”

In a nutshell, none of them felt there was any credibility to what was said given their own knowledge of events in Congress at the time, so felt there was little need to continue investigating the matter further.

And from here the matter seemed settled. That is, until a few weeks later when John Quincy Adams declared Henry Clay as his choice for Secretary of State, just as Kremer had predicted would happen.

Kremer himself would write on September 17, 1827 during the following Presidential run of Jackson vs. Adams that year, “Are the charges true? Can anyone doubt it, who considered, that he has performed the act which the letter charges him with intending to do, and now holds the office, which was proclaimed as the consideration for the service rendered?”

But were there really any such shady dealings?

The matter may well have gone entirely unresolved from here except you better believe, as alluded to, Jackson’s supporters weren’t going to let this one go. Fast-forward to shortly before that next election, a letter by one Carter Beverley was published in the Fayetteville Observer in North Carolina on March 8, 1827 and then quickly thereafter circulated in papers throughout the nation. It stated,

“I have just returned from General Jackson’s. I found a crowd of company with him… He told me this morning, before all his company, in reply to a question I put to him concerning the election of JQ Adams to the presidency, that Mr. Clay’s friends made a proposition to his friends, that if they would promise, for him [General Jackson] not to put Mr. Adams into the seat of secretary of state, Mr. Clay and his friends would, in one hour, make him [Jackson] the president. He most indignantly rejected the proposition, and declared he would not compromise himself; and unless most openly and fairly made the president by Congress, he would never receive it. He declared, that he said to them, he would see the whole earth sink under them, before he would bargain or intrigue for it.”

At first, Clay’s response to the whole thing was that he felt certain Andrew Jackson had not actually said any of these things. However, things would change after Beverley wrote to Jackson asking him to, essentially, back him up that he’d not made the whole thing up. Jackson then wrote to Beverley, on June 6, 1827, stating,

“Your inquiries relative to the proposition of bargain made through Mr. Clay’s friends, to some of mine, concerning the then pending presidential election, were answered freely and frankly at the time, but without any calculation that they would be thrown into the public journals. But Facts can not be altered… I always intended, should Mr. Clay come out over his own name, and deny having any knowledge of the communication made by his friends to my friends, and to me, that I would give him the name of the gentlemen, through whom that communication came….I will repeat, however, again, the occurrence, and to which my reply to you must have conformed, and from which, if there has been any variation, you can correct it. It is this: Early in January, 1825, a member of Congress, of high respectable, visited me one morning, and observed, that he had a communication he was desirous to make to me; that he was informed there was a great intrigue going on, and that it was right I should be informed of it; that he came as a friend, and let me receive the communication as I might… The gentlemen proceeded: He said he had been informed by the friends of Mr. Clay, that the friends of Mr. Adams had made overtures to them, saying, if Mr. Clay and his friends would unite in aid of Mr. Adam’s election, Mr. Clay should be secretary of state; that the friends of Mr. Adams were urging, as a reason to induce the friends of Mr. Clay to accede to their proposition, that if I were elected president, Mr. Adams would be continued secretary of state [i.e. there would be no such position for Clay]…; that the friends of Mr. Clay stated, the west did not wish to separate from the west. and if I would say, or permit any of my confidential friends to say, that in case I were elected president, Mr. Adams should not be continued secretary of state, by a complete union of Mr. Clay and his friends, they would put an end to the presidential contest in one hour. And he was of opinion it was right to fight such intriguers with their own weapons. To which, in substance, I replied- that in politics, as in everything else, my guide was principle; and contrary to the expressed and unbiased will of the people, I never would step into the presidential chair; and requested him to say to Mr. Clay and his friends (for I did suppose he had come from Mr. Clay, though he used the term of ‘Mr. Clay’s friends’), that before I would reach the president chair, by such means of bargain and corruption, I would see the earth open and swallow both Mr. Clay and his friends and myself with them… The second day after this communication and reply, it was announced in the newspapers that Mr. Clay had come out openly and avowedly in favor of Mr. Adams…”

Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately and intended giving events leading up to it, Clay briefly guested at the very house Beverly was also guesting in when he had possession of this letter from Andrew Jackson, and shortly after Clay was given a copy of it. His honor once again besmirched, this time by none other than Andrew Jackson himself, an angered Clay then had the letter published, which likely was the intended result of giving him a copy in the first place, along with his response both denying the accusation that he had been involved in any such thing, and expressing his strong sentiment that he highly doubted any of his constituents had either. He also issued a challenge to Jackson to, essentially, put his money where his mouth was. Writing on June 28, 1827,

“General Jackson, having at last voluntarily placed himself in the attitude of my public accuser, we are now fairly at issue. I rejoice, that a specific accusation, by a responsible accuser, has at length appeared, though at the distance of near two years and a half since the charge was first brought forth by Mr. George Kremer…. Such being the accusation, and the prosecutor, and the issues between us, I have now a right to expect that he will substantiate his charges by the exhibition of satisfactory evidence. In that event, there is no punishment that would exceed the measure of my offense. In the opposite event, what ought to be the judgment of the American people, is cheerfully submitted to their wisdom and justice.”

In response, Jackson wrote the following letter on July 18, 1827. Stating. “…This disclosure was made to me by Mr. James Buchanan, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, a gentleman of the first respectively and intelligence. The evening before, he had communicated substantially the same proposition to Major Eaton, my colleague in the senate, with a desire warmly manifested, that he should communicate with me, and ascertain my views on the subject. This he declined doing, suggesting to Mr. Buchanan, that he, as well as himself, could converse with me, and ascertain my opinion on the matter… It was the morning succeeding this interview, after Major Eaton had objected to converse with me on the subject, and before I had set out from my lodgings to the capitol that Mr. Buchanan came to visit me, and where the conversation I have stated took place… What I have stated are the facts of a conversation between myself and a member of Congress of high respectability. The conclusions and inferences from that conversation-the time, manner, and all the circumstances- satisfied my mind, that it was not unauthorized. So I have thought, and so I still think. And yet, I again here repeat, that, in this supposition, I have possibly done Mr. Clay injustice. If he shall be able to sustain the averments he has made, and acquit himself of any participation and agency in the matter, I beg leave to assure him, that, so far from affording me pain, it will give me pleasure. I certainly can have no desire, that the character of my country, through the acts of prominent citizen, shall rest under any serious imputation. For the honor of that country, I should greatly prefer that any inference I have made, may turn out to be ill founded.”

He then goes on at length to question why Clay, if he was truly innocent, didn’t push for the committee to investigate further and that, “innocence never seeks for safety, through covert ways, and hidden ambuscades. She fights by day, and in the open plain, and proud in her own strength, meets her enemy fearlessly.”

Of course, contrary to what Jackson is implying here, Clay very publicly never shied from the accusation and, indeed, was the one who immediately brought it to Congress’s attention and asked that his guilt or innocence be investigated, with this inquiry only ending when the Jackson supporter in Kremer was unwilling to back up in any way his claim or testify on the matter at all. On top of that, it was once again Clay who, having received a copy of Jackson’s unpublished letter, brought it to the public’s attention and once again now challenged Andrew Jackson himself to give any evidence whatsoever as to Clay’s guilt- more or less doing exactly as Jackson stated an innocent person would do, “fight by day, and in the open plain, and proud in her own strength, meets her enemy fearlessly.”

On top of that, while Jackson had stated if Clay ever tried to deny this had occurred, he’d have come out with the name immediately, the fact is Clay vehemently denied the whole thing very publicly from day 1 and Jackson was well aware of all of this. Further, it was questioned by many others that if Jackson had believed this from the beginning and knew the principle individuals involved in the scandal, as he so claimed, why had he not himself felt obligated to press it given the seriousness of the corruption charge when the matter was being investigated by Congress and they lacked any thread to pull when Kremer refused to testify? Especially as he’d also apparently been circulating this story among his constituents since not long after the former election. With one J.U. Waring writing to Clay,

“I was present at one of these conversations, when the general observed, in speaking of the late election, that the people had been cheated; that the corruptions and intrigues of Washington had defeated the will of the people, in the election of their president.’ I waited till this branch of the conversation was closed, and finding no palliative, left the company, which was large, and composed of ladies and gentlemen, of the first respectability, and at a public tavern. Several followed, and his remarks became the subject of street conversation, in which I remarked, that, as highly as I was disposed to think of the general, particularly for his military success, I could not approve such a course; that, if corruption existed, and that known to him, he surely should not have been the first to greet Mr. Adams upon his elevation; and that, if you had participated, it was his duty to have exposed it when your nomination was before the senate…”

And note as alluded to in this letter, directly after the election results were in, Jackson did have very friendly discourse with Adams at a reception held by then President Monroe congratulating Adams on his victory. Jackson had also reported to the Register not long after that he, to quote “was satisfied with the result” of the election. And “that he was not fit for the presidential chair; that he could not get on; that his proper place was at the head of any army.” And when later invited to a dinner gathering among those unhappy with the results, Jackson stated, “any evidence of kindness and regard, such as you propose, might, by many, be viewed, as conveying with it exception, murmurings, and feelings of complaint, which I sincerely hope belong to none of my friends.”

On top of this, Jackson went out of his way to describe James Buchanan as a “member of Congress, of high respectability” and yet shortly thereafter with some great contradiction condemned Buchanan as an agent of Clay’s trying to broker a corrupt deal for a vote in exchange for the office of Secretary of State.

Finally, rather than supply any hard evidence, Jackson simply supplied the name of one of his own supporters, future U.S. President James Buchanan, not Clay’s being involved in the matter, and simply assumed Clay’s friends were behind it. And then, without a shred of hard evidence in any of it, finally concluded in challenging Clay to somehow prove it hadn’t happened.

Needless to say, Clay was rather exasperated by this response of Jackson’s sole evidence being one of his own supporters allegedly claiming Clay had made such a deal and trying to put the ball back in Clay’s court to prove a negative. Clay noted of this in a speech he gave on July 12th,

“This compendious mode of administering justice, by first hanging, and then trying a man…, according to the precepts of the Jackson code, is sanctioned by no respectable system of jurisprudence.”

And later on August 30th, “It is in vain that these revilers have been called upon for their proofs- have been defied, and are again invited to enter upon any mode of fair investigation and trial. Shrinking from every impartial examination, they persevere, with increased zeal, in the propagation of calumny, under the hope of supplying, by the frequency and boldness of assertion, the want of truth and the deficiency of evidence.”

And that “The extraordinary ground has been taken, that the accusers were not bound to establish by proof the guilt of their designated victim. In a civilized, Christian, and free community, the monstrous principle has been assumed, that accusation and conviction are synonymous; and that the persons who deliberately bring forward an atrocious charge, are exempted from all obligations to substantiate it! … No one has ever contended that proof should be exclusively that of eye-witnesses, testifying from their sense positively and directly to the fact. Political, like other offenses, may be established by circumstantial as well as positive evidence. But I do contend that some evidence, be it what it may, ought to be exhibited. If there be none, how do the accusers know that an offense has been perpetrated? If they do know it, let us have the facts on which their conviction is based. I will not even assert that, in the public affairs, a citizen has not a right freely to express his opinions of public men, and to speculate upon the motives of their conduct. But if he chooses to promulgate opinions, let them be given as opinions. The public will correctly judge of their value and their grounds. No one has a right to put forth a positive assertion, that apolitical offense has been committed, unless he stands prepared to sustain, by satisfactory proof of some kind, its actual existence…”

But going back to the accusation, the name of the individual who started it all now finally revealed, the ball was in future U.S. President James Buchanan’s court to give his side of the story and, hopefully for Jackson’s sake, offer some actual evidence.

While Jackson may have been banking on Buchanan’s support of his statements given Buchanan was a huge supporter of Jackson, well, Buchanan did not, though did explain the events of the day from his perspective. Writing to the Lancaster Journal on August 8, 1827, Buchanan states,

“In the month of December, 1824, a short time after the commencement of the session of Congress, I heard, among other rumors then in circulation, that General Jackson had determined, should he be elected president, to continue Mr. Adams secretary of state. Although I felt certain he had never intimated such an intention, yet I was sensible, that nothing could be better calculated, both to cool the ardor of his friends, and inspire his enemies with confidence, than the belief that he had already selected his chief competitor for the highest office within his gift. I thought General Jackson owed it to himself, and to the cause in which his political friends were engaged, to contradict this report; and to declare that he would not appoint to that office the man, however worthy he might be, who stood at the head of the most formidable part of his political enemies…. Mr. Markly urged me to [speak with Jackson]; and observed, if General Jackson had not determined who he would appoint secretary of state, and should say that it would not be Mr. Adams, it might be of great advantage to our cause for us to so declare, upon his own authority. We should then be placed upon the same footing with the Adams men, and might fight them with their own weapons. That the western members would naturally prefer voting for a western man, if there were a probability that the claims of Mr. Clay to the second office in the government should be fairly estimated; and that, if they thought proper to vote for General Jackson, they could soon decide the contest in his favor.”

Note here, the point being if Jackson would denounce the rumor he intended Adams for Secretary of State and have it implied he preferred Clay or that Clay might be given that position, they might thus steal some votes from Adams to Jackson by leveraging the office of the Secretary of State.

He goes on, “I called upon General Jackson. After the company had left him, by which I found him surrounded, he asked me to take a walk with him; and, while we were walking together upon the street, I introduced the subject… I then stated to him, there was a report in circulation, that he had determined he would appoint Mr. Adams secretary of state, in case he were elected president, and that I wished to ascertain from him, whether he had ever intimated such an intention that he must at once perceive how injurious to his election such a report might be; that no doubt there were several able and ambitious men in the country, among whom I thought Mr. Clay might be included, who were aspiring to that office; and, if it were believed he had already determined to appoint his chief competitor, it might have a most unhappy effect upon their exertions, and those of their friends; that unless he had so determined, I thought this report should be promptly contradicted under his own authority.”

One again now explicitly telling Jackson would it not be best to deny the rumor and give implication that Clay might be prime for the position were he to side with Jackson?

He further notes, “After I had finished, the general declared, he had not the least objection to answer my question; that he thought well of Mr. Adams, but had never said, or intimated, that he would or would not, appoint him secretary of state; … that if he should ever be elected president,… that he would then go into office… at perfect liberty to fill the offices of the government with the men, whom, at the time, he believed to be the ablest and the best in the country…. I then asked him, if I were at liberty to repeat his answer? He said, I was at perfect liberty to do so, to any person I thought proper. I need scarcely remark, that I afterward availed myself of the privilege… I do not recollect, that General Jackson told me I might repeat his answer to Mr. Clay and his friends.”

Noteworthy here, according to Clay much later in life, Buchanan did approach him after this, stating that “Shortly after Mr. Buchanan’s entry into the room, he introduced the subject of the approaching presidential election, and spoke of the certainty of the election of his favorite, adding, that ‘he would form the most splendid cabinet, that the country had ever had.’ Mr. Letcher asked, ‘How could he have one more distinguished than that of Mr. Jefferson, in which were both Madison and Gallatin? Where would he be able to find equally eminent men?’ Mr. Buchanan replied, that ‘HE WOULD NOT GO OUT OF THIS ROOM FOR A SECRETARY OF STATE’” all while looking directly at Clay. Clay alleges he chose not to publish this encounter nor have Letcher do so after a discussion with Buchanan over it, in which Buchanan allegedly begged him not to.

In another account, one J. Sloane of the Ohio delegation states a similar occurrence leading up to Clay announcing his decision of who he would support, writing “General Houston commenced by suggesting that he supposed the Ohio delegation were all going to vote for General Jackson. To this, I answered that I could not undertake to speak for them, for, so far as I knew, no meeting or consultation had taken place among them. The manner of General Houston was anxious, and evinced much solicitude, and at this point of the conversation, he exclaimed: What a splendid administration it would make, with Old Hickory for president, and Mr. Clay secretary of state!’ … The conversation was continued for a considerable time, and for the most part, had relation to western interests, as connected with the presidency, and was concluded by General Houston’s observing: ‘Well, I hope you, from Ohio, will aid us in electing General Jackson, and then, your man-meaning Mr. Clay-CAN HAVE ANYTHING HE PLEASES.’… These expressions of General Houston made a strong impression on my mind at that time, and from the relations known to subsist between him and General Jackson, I had not then, nor at any time since, a doubt, but that they embodied the feelings of that personage [Jackson], and that it was the object of both, that Mr. Clay and his friends should so understand it.”

But going back to Buchanan’s letter, he concludes, “I called upon General Jackson, upon the occasion which I have mentioned solely as his friend, upon my individual responsibility, and not as the agent of Mr. Clay, or any other person. I never have been the political friend of Mr. Clay, since he became a candidate for the office of president, as you very well know. Until I saw General Jackson’s letter to Mr. Beverley of the 6th and at the same time was informed by a letter from the editor of the United States Telegraph, that I was the person to whom he alluded, the conception never once entered my head, that he believed me to be the agent of Mr. Clay, or of his friends, or that I had intended to propose to him terms of any kind from them, or that he could have supposed me to be capable of expressing ‘the opinion that it was right to fight such intriguers with their own weapons.’ Such a supposition, had I entered it, would have rendered me exceedingly unhappy, as there is no man upon earth, whose good opinion I more valued, than that of General Jackson.”

And as for Jackson’s close confidant in the Eaton connection, who seemingly was the one who informed Kremer of all this or convinced him to have Eaton’s letter published, as the case may be, the night before the original accusation was published, Buchanan states, “With another remark I shall close this communication. Before I had the conversation with General Jackson, which I have detailed, I called upon Major Eaton, and requested him to ask General Jackson whether he had ever declared or intimated, that he would appoint Mr. Adams secretary of state, and expressed a desire that the general should say, if consistent with the truth, that he did not intend to appoint him to that office. I believed, that such a declaration would have a happy influence upon the election, and I endeavored to convince him that such would be the effect. The conversation between us was not so full, as that with General Jackson. The major politely declined to comply with my request, and advised me to propose the question to the general myself, as I possess a full share of his confidence.”

Thus, in the end, at no point did Buchanan claim any deal had been struck between Adams and Clay, merely that rumors were swirling that Clay would be Adams’ likely choice for Secretary of State, and that Jackson ought to get the word out that Clay would be a prime candidate for that office if Jackson were elected instead.

Others, such as the aforementioned Markley would also ring in more or less asserting what Buchanan had said, but with some rather interesting additions asserting that Buchanan had also urged for contacting Clay to try to make a deal over the matter of Clay becoming Secretary of State if he chose Jackson,

“Mr. B replied, that no one felt more anxious for various reasons than he did himself; that it was important not only for the success of General Jackson’s election, that Mr. Clay should go with Pennsylvania, but on account of his ulterior political prospect- declaring that he Mr. B hoped to see Mr. Clay president of the United States, and that was another reason why he should like to see Mr. Clay secretary of state, in case General Jackson was elected; and that, if he were certain that Mr. Clay’s views were favorable to General Jackson’s election, he would take an opportunity of talking with General Jackson on the subject, or get Major Eaton to do so; that he thought, by doing so, he would confer a particular benefit on his country, and that he could see nothing wrong in it. Mr. B. urged me to use no delay in seeing Mr. Clay. I told him I would, and accordingly called upon Mr. Clay, at his boarding-house I think the evening after this conversation; but he was not at his lodgings. I called to see him again, but he had some of his friends with him, and I had no opportunity of conversing with him, nor had I ever any conversation with him, until the evening of the 10th or 11th of January, prior to my leaving Washington for Pennsylvania…. The conversation I then had with him was a very general character. No mention was made of cabinet appointments, and I did not ascertain which of the candidates Mr. Clay would support…. I never did, either directly or indirectly, receive from Mr. Clay or his friends any intimation which could be construed even by political rancor into such a commission or anything even remotely approaching to it. Had any such agency by any one been tendered I should have indignantly rejected it. I will go further and state that never did I in the course of my conversation with Mr. Clay hear him say or express a desire that in the event of the election of General Jackson, Mr. Adams, or Mr. Crawford, he should wish to be secretary of state, or hold any station in the cabinet. Further, I never had, to any one at any time, or on any occasion, represented myself, or wished it to be understood that I was authorized to receive, or to make, overtures on the part of Mr. Clay or his friends. … I did not know, until ten days after the election of Mr. Adams, that Mr. Clay had been offered the appointment of secretary of state; and it is a well-known fact, that after he had the offer, he consulted many of his friends whether he should or should not accept it. He told me in a conversation he did me the honor to hold with me, on the subject that the acceptance of it would not only be to him a sacrifice of domestic happiness, but a serious pecuniary loss. I know also that not only his immediate personal and political friends but many of those who voted for other candidates were desirous that he should accept the station and urged that his country had claims upon him and would never see him suffer from devotion to her best interests. I am free to acknowledge that at the time of the conversation between Mr. Buchanan and myself my impression was that General Jackson would be elected; and it was pretty generally talked of as well as understood among many of his friends that in the event of his election Mr. Clay would have the offer of secretary of state… ”

As for the other man roped into all this, Major Eaton would write on September 12, 1827, “…In this application and interview, I felt that Mr. Buchanan was acting on the ground of anxious solicitude for the success of General Jackson and from a desire that nothing… should interpose to prevent the election of one for whom he felt more than common interest. I considered that in his zeal he felt it to be right to defend the citadel against unlooked for assaults and believed consequently that the enemy should be met with their own weapons.”

And that’s, well, all the evidence there is really. One of Jackson’s supporters heard a rumor that Jackson was going to select Adams as Secretary of State if Jackson won, felt that the rumor needed to be refuted and that, instead, as another rumor had been circulating that Adams would select Clay as his Secretary of State, that Jackson should at the least imply that would be the case if he, himself, was elected and, if other’s assertions true, Buchanan also actively tried to make sure Clay would be informed of all of this.

And somewhere along that game of telephone, whether deliberately, or just a misinterpretation, the idea that Adam had made a deal with Clay to offer him the Secretary of State job if elected came to the forefront and ultimately may well have markedly changed U.S. history in how it was subsequently used against Adams and Clay, and to bolster Jackson’s position in the following election as a man of the people who’d been robbed of the previous election owing to political wranglings of the elite.

But in all of this, Buchanan seems to have instigated it all, with no individual on Clay’s side involved in the slightest.

Or, at least, that’s what the evidence we have seems to show. It is conjectured given how close Eaton and Jackson were, and that Eaton had seemingly instigated the original Kremer letter, if not written it himself, that the real architect of the actual accusation of Clay selling his vote and influence to Adams for the Secretary of the State position was none other than Andrew Jackson himself. Especially as no one else directly involved, outside of seemingly Eaton through Kremer, ever brought this up except Jackson who was actively spreading the rumor around in the interim between the two Presidential elections.

Whatever the case there, Daniel Webster would write to Clay about all this, even before Jackson revealed the name of Buchanan, predicting all this outcome, stating, “Your reply to General Jackson’s letter is admirable, and has been most favorably received everywhere, at least on this side of the allegations. It places the general in a position where he can not remain. He must move in some direction; and whatever movement he makes, will either embarrass his friends, or still more embarrass himself. I have a suspicion that the ‘respectable member of Congress’ is Mr. Buchanan. If this should turn out so, it will place him in an awkward situation, since, it seems, he [Buchanan] did recommend a bargain with your friends…”

When Webster would later read both Jackson and Buchanan’s accounts, he would go on on August 22, 1827, “…Buchanan is treated too gently. Many persons think his letter candid. I deem it otherwise. It seems to me to be labored very hard to protect the general, as far as he could, without injury to himself…” And in another letter Webster states, “I am satisfied, upon my conscience, that the whole business originated with General Jackson himself; whether through mistake, or from intention…”

If it was truly from Jackson, it was a master stroke. In that it placed Clay and Adams in a no win situation right when rumors were that Clay was about to announce for Adams. If, after the accusation came out, Clay really did side with Adams instead of Jackson, many in the public would assume a deal had been struck whether Clay was ever given the Secretary of State or not. And it also seemingly assured he could not be selected Secretary of State by Adams, as was the rumor at the time, as if he was selected, and accepted the offer, it would confirm the rumor and his reputation tarnished beyond repair and seemingly no chance at a future presidential run. If he wasn’t selected, he was less of a threat in the elections after Adams as well. And, of course, the whole affair also sullied Adam’s reputation.

Further, in all of this, the accusation, coming from a seemingly reputable source in a member of Congress, would be enough because it’s generally impossible to prove a negative, and the general public tends to eat this stuff up like candy for breakfast when it comes to alleged government intrigue. In other words, there was no way for Henry Clay to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that he didn’t make such a deal no matter what he did at this point unless he sided with Jackson in the election. That he supported Adams very publicly was enough evidence for many against him.

Of course, Clay did indeed support Adams and in the end was selected Secretary of State. Leaving many to still question, despite the lack of any other evidence up to this point, whether there really was a corrupt bargain.

For that, while nobody knows exactly what John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay discussed in their meeting, and if such an offer was made, though we’ll get to what Adams says in his journal that they talked about shortly, what we do have are literally hundreds of surviving letters from various individuals involved in all this discussing it in great detail and their thoughts.

So what did they all have to say?

Well, how about we start with the man who broke the full story himself after hearing Jackson tell the tale of corruption, Carter Beverley, who would completely recant, later in life writing to Clay to apologize. Stating,

“It will be no doubt a matter of some astonishment to you, in receiving from me the present address…. Although the time is quite far gone, since I became very innocently instrumental in circulating throughout the country, a very great attack upon your character and virtue as a gentleman, and certainly a very heavy one, as a public man, I feel exceedingly desirous to relieve you, as far as I can, from the slander, and my own feelings from the severe compunction that is within me, of having been, though neither directly nor indirectly, your personal accuser; yet, that I was drawn indiscreetly into the representation of an attack upon you…. This letter is intended to show you that the long lapse of time, and the many growing circumstances of the country and the government, have long ago convinced me that the very greatest injustice was done you in the charge made. I had, too, an opportunity lately of reading over very calmly and dispassionately a file of newspapers, containing the whole affair, and carefully dilated upon it. Mr. Buchanan, who was represented to be your accuser, exhibited no proof whatever against you; and he even denied having ever made the charge upon you. I have discharged my mind in addressing myself so fully to you, and can only add, that if a publication of this letter can render you any essential service (though I do not deserve it), you have full liberty from me, to let the public see it. One circumstance I beg to assure you of, that, whatever my verbal and written expressions of you were (and I suppose I must have given much scope to both, though I recollect now nothing of what I did say), I again say, that I am most thoroughly convinced, that you were most untruthfully, and therefore unjustly treated; for I have never seen any evidence to substantiate at all the charge…. It can surely now no longer be matter of doubt upon their minds; for he who was generally believed to be the circulator of the egregious slander against you, hereby revokes his belief of it, and unequivocally declares, that it is unproved, and stands utterly unsupported to this time-a period of fifteen or sixteen years.”

As for Adams thoughts, he mostly stayed silent about the whole affair until after his time as President had ended, but ultimately wrote a letter to a committee in New Jersey in 1829 stating, “Upon him the foulest slanders have been showered. Long known and appreciated, as successively a member of both houses of your national legislature, as the unrivaled speaker, and at the same time most efficient leader of debates in one of them; as an able and successful negotiator of your interests, in war and peace, with foreign powers, and as a powerful candidate for the highest of your trusts, the department of state itself was a station, which, by its bestowal, could confer neither profit, nor honor, upon him, but upon which he has shed unfading honor, by the manner in which he has discharged its duties. Prejudice and passion have charged him with obtaining that office by bargain and corruption. Before you, my fellow-citizens, in the presence of our country and Heaven, I pronounce that charge totally unfounded. This tribute of justice is due from me to him, and I seize, with pleasure, the opportunity afforded me by your letter, of discharging the obligation. As to my motives for tendering to him the department of state when I did, let that man who questions them, come forward; let him look around among statesmen and legislators of this nation, and of that day; let him then select and name the man, whom, by his pre-eminent talents, by his splendid services, by his ardent patriotism, by his all-embracing public spirit, by his fervid eloquence in behalf of the rights and liberties of mankind, and by his long experience in the affairs of the Union, foreign and domestic, a president of the United States, intent only upon the honor and welfare of his country, ought to have preferred to HENRY CLAY. Let him name the man, and then judge you, my fellow-citizens, of my motives.”

The highly religions Adams even more strongly stated at the age of 75 and nearing his own death when speaking at a reception in Kentucky, “I thank you, sir, for the opportunity you have given me of speaking of the great statesman, who was associated with me in the administration of the general government, at my earnest solicitation; who belongs not to Kentucky alone, but to the whole Union; and who is not only an honor to this state, and this nation, but to mankind. The charges to which you refer, after my term of service had expired, and it was proper for me to speak, I denied before the whole country, and I here reiterate and reaffirm that denial; and as I expect shortly to appear before my God, to answer for the conduct of my whole life, should those charges have found their way to the throne of eternal justice, I WILL, in the presence of OMNIPOTENCE, pronounce them FALSE.”

Further, in a circular requesting any member of Congress at the time of the events in question to come forward with their thoughts and recollections of the whole affair, they did so- In droves, with many dozens of letters from various congressmen and delegates more or less all saying some version of the same thing.

For example, of the idea that it was Clay who convinced the Ohio delegates to side with Adams, Duncan McArthur of that delegation would write on May 18, 1827 noting, as countless others would corroborate in their own testimonies, that it was Jackson’s friends, not Adams or Clay, who were most pressing on the matter of promises to Clay and others in exchange for votes, “The fact is, that the Ohio delegation-at least a large majority of them-were the first of Mr. Clay’s friends, who came to the determination of voting for Mr. Adams, and that too, without having ascertained Mr. Clay’s views on the subject. The language of some of the friends of the general, before the election, was, that the friends of Mr. Clay durst not vote for any man, other than General Jackson. This was often repeated, in a menacing manner. But, it is also true, that others of the general’s friends used, what they no doubt conceived, more persuasive language. Indeed, they appeared to be willing to make any promises, which they thought would induce the friends of Mr. Clay to vote for General Jackson.”

Joseph Vance would chime in on July 12, 1827, “As one of the original friends of Mr. Clay, I was in the habit of free and unreserved conversations, both with him and his other friends, relative to that election, and I am bold to say, that I never heard a whisper of anything like a condition, on which our vote was to be given, mentioned, either by Mr. Clay himself, or any of his friends, at any time, or under any circumstances.”

A delegate from Louisiana, Wm Brent would write on June 5, “In allusion to the Fayetteville letter, I can not express the indignant feelings it excited. It is the fabrication of a desperate man, who, to obtain his object, dares to assert what he knows to be false. You ask me to say, whether I know or believe, that such a proposition was ever made, or whether conditions of any sort were proposed, by the friends of Mr. Clay, to any one, ‘on the compliance with which their vote was made to depend.’ No honorable man can believe for a moment that such a proposition was ever made, or such a condition stipulated. I was a friend of Mr. Clay throughout the contest; I was in the confidence of all his friends; and I declare to God that I never heard of such things, until it was asserted by the disappointed adherents of General Jackson. I am not only ignorant of any such arrangements, but do not believe they ever existed.”

David Trimble of the Kentucky delegation would go on that months before Clay and Adams ever had their little meeting, “I met with Mr. Clay at Frankfort, Kentucky, about the first of October, 1824. He [Mr. Clay] said that he could not, consistently with his principles, vote for General Jackson, under any possible circumstances. I made some reference to the supposed difference of opinion between himself and Mr. Adams, about the treaty of Ghent. He said, in reply, that it had been greatly magnified by the friends of his competitors, for electioneering purposes; that it ought to have no influence in the vote which he might be called upon to give; that, if he was weak enough to allow his personal feelings to influence his public conduct, there would be no change in his mind on that account, because he was then upon much worse terms with General Jackson about the Seminole war, than he could ever be with Mr. Adams about the treaty of Ghent; but that, in the selection of a chief magistrate for the Union, he would endeavor to disregard all private feelings, and look entirely to the interests of the country, and the safety of its institutions. I should have thought strange of it, if Mr. Clay had voted for General Jackson, after saying what he did.”

J.S. Johnston, a Senator from Louisiana would also write to Clay on November 17 1827 confirming Clay’s unswaying opinion with regards to Adams vs Jackson, “I met you, for the first time, on your return to Washington, in December, 1824, on the Saturday or Sunday evening previous to the meeting of Congress, and at that time we had a long and free conversation, on the approaching election… I remarked to you, that, in all probability, the contest would be finally reduced to Mr. Adams and General Jackson, and the conversation turned upon their comparative merits and qualifications, and a long discussion ensued. You drew a parallel between them, in a manner I thought very just and respectful to both. You concluded by expressing a preference for Mr. Adams, which turned principally on his talents, and experience in civil affairs. . . No fact ever came to my knowledge that could, in the slightest degree, justify the charge that has been exhibited. On the contrary, I know that your opinion did not undergo any change, from the time I first saw you, on your return to Washington.”

Daniel Drake would also write to the National Intelligencer also claiming Clay had known he would go for Adams long before the meeting between Adams and Clay, stating, “GENTLEMEN: At different times before Mr. Clay left this place for Washington, last fall, I had conversations with him on the subject of a choice of a president by the house of representatives. In all of them he expressed himself as having, long before, decided in favor of Mr. Adams, in case the contest should be between that gentleman and General Jackson. My last interview with him, was, I think, the very day before his departure, when he was still more explicit, as it was then certain, that the election would be transferred to that tribunal, and highly probable, that he would not be among the number returned. In the course of the conversation, I took occasion to express my sentiments, with respect to the delicate and difficult circumstances under which he would be placed; on which he remarked… that nothing should deter him from the duty of giving his vote, and that no state of things could arise, that would justify him in preferring General Jackson to Mr. Adams, or induce him to support the former. So decisive, indeed, were his declarations on this subject, that, had he voted otherwise than he did, I should have been compelled to regard him as deserving that species of censure, which has been cast upon him, for consistently adhering to an early and deliberate resolution.”

The Governor of Maryland, Joseph Kent would sum up in a letter written on May 15, 1827, “Our friend, Mr. Clay, appears to be the chief object of persecution, with the opposition. They are, with great industry, conducting a systematic attack upon him, which commenced with the Kremer story, an entire fabrication. At the time the plot opened, I was a member of the house of representatives, and heard Kremer declare, he never in his life designed to charge Mr. Clay with anything dishonorable. The old man naturally honest, was imposed on at the time, by a powerful influence, and constrained to act his part in an affair, which, from beginning to end, was as much a fiction, as the Merry Wives of Windsor,’ or the ‘School for Scandal.’ … Mr. Clay I have known intimately for sixteen years. His public career is completely identified with every event of the country, from that period to the present time, whether in peace or war. During the late war, I have seen the house of representatives, after having gone out of committee of the whole, return to it again, for the sole purpose, of affording Mr. Clay (then speaker) an opportunity of putting down the desperate and infuriated advocates of British tyranny, insult, and injury. But his enemies say Mr. Adams bargained with him. This is assertion, without proof, and is destitute of truth, as it is of manly frankness. His superior qualifications placed him in the department of state, and history furnishes no instance, when so superior a man had to bargain for a high station, for which his peculiar fitness was evident to everyone.”

Thus, in the end, once again, on the one hand we have Jackson and his supporter in Kremer alone claiming a deal was made by Adams and Clay, without offering any evidence whatsoever to support the claim. We also have every one of those among Jackson’s supporters who were directly involved in the affair stating they never said that.

On the other side, we have a huge number of the people on all sides involved in the voting coming forward claiming they likewise had never heard even the implication of such impropriety outside of the accusation from Kremer and then later Jackson. And many also noted Clay was the logical choice for the position of Secretary of State anyway for whoever was elected.

We also have alleged participant John Quincy Adams- a man who, like his father before him, was well known for his impeccable integrity to a fault, including countless times proving, like his father before him, if he had to choose what was right that might hurt him or what was wrong but might benefit him, he’d go with what was right come what may, such as when John Adams, one of the most ardent opposers of the British during the Revolution, defended the British soldiers during the Boston Massacre simply because he wanted to make sure they got a fair trial, even though he felt that in doing so, he had just ruined his family. Writing to his wife, Abigail, “I…have consented to my own ruin, to your ruin, and to the ruin of our children…[but] the law…will not bend to the uncertain wishes, imaginations, and wanton tempers of men.”

Most significant to our discussion today, as for his son in John Quincy, he was, as mentioned, a huge opponent of the spoils system, instead advocating for the merit system of political appointment. And, indeed, when elected President put his money where his mouth was, retaining many individuals in prominent positions who were not his supporters simply because he deemed them best suited for the job.

Adams noted in his Journal on March 5, 1825, “I determined to renominate every person, against whom there was no complaint which would have warranted his removal; and renominated every person nominated by Mr Monroe, and upon whose nomination the Senate had declined acting.”

As you might imagine, putting many of your political enemies, rather than supporters, in prominent positions proved to be a massive mistake, as they had a tendency to actively work against not only what Adams was trying to do as President, but against the man himself, which was all to have dire consequences for both his efforts as President and in his reelection bid.

Adams was not unaware of this potential outcome, with many of his friends and confidants explicitly pointing out this would happen and, during all of it, continually trying to get him to change tack. But he refused, feeling that removing the most capable individual in his estimation from a given position just because they didn’t support him wasn’t the right thing to do for the nation.

Going further on the Adams’ side, his extremely strong sense of morality and the importance to never stray from doing the right thing was a frequent source of musings in his journal. For example, he once wrote, “It is essential. that you should form and adopt certain rules or principles for the government of your own conduct and temper. Unless you have such rules and principles, there will be numberless occasions on which you will have no guide for your government but your passions.”

He also once wrote his son, George Washington Adams on November 28, 1827, noting of the practice of Journaling, that if you weren’t accurate in it, it was probably a reflection that your conduct was poor, stating, “A man who commits to paper from day to day the employment of his time, the places he frequents, the persons with whom he converses, the actions with which he is occupied, will have a perpetual guard over himself. His record is a second conscience. He will fly from worthless associates and from dishonest deeds, to avoid the alternative of becoming a self-accuser or of falsifying by the suppression of his own testimony to his own actions…”

He also frequently wrote about other famed individuals of his era, analyzing how their poor character inevitably led to their downfall, and lamenting how much more they could have been if they’d cultivated better moral centers, including discussing everyone from Lord Byron to Napoleon. On the latter, writing in 1814, “The Emperor Napoleon says that he was never seduced by prosperity; but when he comes to be judged impartially by posterity that will not be their sentence. His fortune will be among the wonders of the age in which he has lived. His military talent and genius will place him high in the rank of great captains; but his intemperate passion, his presumptuous insolence, and his Spanish and Russian wars, will reduce him very nearly to the level of ordinary men. At all events he will be one of the standing examples of human vicissitude, ranged not among the Alexanders, Caesars, and Charlemagnes, but among the Hannibals, Pompeys, and Charles the 12th.”

Thus, in the end, beyond the complete lack of evidence against Clay, for a man like Adams, such a corrupt bargain would seemingly have been wildly out of character. Especially given it had always seemed likely Clay would support him, not Jackson, anyway. So there was little point even if he had been willing to be so unscrupulous.

And speaking of Adams’ seemingly intractable morals and advocating for the importance of accuracy in his journal, This now all finally brings us to what Adams would state Clay and he discussed during their supposed meeting where the corrupt bargain would allegedly be made. In his journal on January 9th, 1825, he writes,

“Mr Clay came at 6. and spent the Evening with me, in a long Conversation explanatory of the past, and prospective of the future— He said that the time was drawing near, when the choice must be made in the House of Representatives, of a President, from the three Candidates presented by the electoral College. That he had been much urged and solicited with regard to the part in that transaction that he should take, and had not been five minutes landed at his lodgings, before he had been applied to, by a friend of Mr Crawford’s, in a manner so gross that it had disgusted him— That some of my friends also, disclaiming indeed to have any authority from me, had repeatedly applied to him directly or indirectly, urging considerations personal to himself as motives to his course— He had thought it best to reserve some time his determination to himself. First, to give a decent time for his own funeral solemnities as a Candidate; and secondly to prepare and predispose all his friends to a state of neutrality between the three Candidates who would be before the House, so that they might be free ultimately to take that course which might be most conducive to the Public Interest— The time had now come, at which he might be explicit in his communication with me, and he had for that purpose asked this confidential interview— He wished me as far as I might think proper to satisfy him with regard to some principles of great public importance, but without any personal considerations for himself— In the question to come before the House, between General Jackson, Mr Crawford and myself, he had no hesitation in saying that his preference would be for me.”

Thus Adams claiming in this entry written before any rumors of a corrupt bargain existed, that not only was nothing of the sort discussed, but insinuates a friend of Crawford had made such a sentiment towards Clay, which disgusted Clay, and that Clay, to quote “without any personal considerations for himself” wished to simply discuss Adams’ policies and thoughts on matters of public importance to help solidify his decision on which candidate he should choose.

Thus, from all of this data combined, it seems highly improbable that any such corrupt bargain ever occurred. And more likely it was just something the Jackson camp came up with to further their own ends.

This all does bring up the question of, if these accusations were swirling, why on Earth would Adams select Henry Clay for the post of Secretary of State, and why on Earth would Clay accept it when they both knew this would just confirm the whole thing in their opponents minds?

As for the Adams side, as previously noted in his 1829 address of the issue, as well as alluded to given Adams strong stance on selecting the best person for a given job in his administration no matter what, he simply felt Clay was the best man for the job, and at that point actively challenged anyone who claimed there had been a corrupt bargain to name someone more suited for the role at the time.

As for why Henry Clay would then accept the position once offered. Well, he wasn’t sure he would at first. In the aftermath of learning Adams had indeed selected him for this role, he would write to several of his compatriots asking their advice on the matter, such as one Judge Brooke, writing, on February 14, 1825, “MY DEAR SIR: Southard remains in the navy department. I am offered that of the state, but have not yet decided. The others not yet determined on. Crawford retires. What shall I do?”

In the end Clay would sum up his decision to accept in response to WM. H. Crawford. Crawford wrote to Clay that he did not believe the accusations against Clay and Adams, but that “I disapprove of you accepting an office under him.”,

Clay would respond, “When two courses present themselves in human affairs, and one only is pursued, experience develops the errors of the selection which has been made. Those which would have attended the opposite course, can only be a matter of speculation. Thus it is in the case referred to. We see, or think we see, distinctly, the errors of the alternative which I embraced. But, are we sure, that, if I had chosen the other, I should not have been liable to greater hazard, or more animadversion? The truth is, as I have often said, my condition was one full of embarrassments, whatever way I might act. My own judgment was rather opposed to my acceptance of the department of state; but my friends-and let me add, two of your best friends, Mr. McLane, of Delaware, and Mr. Forsyth, urged me strongly not to decline it. It was represented by my friends, that I should get no credit for the forbearance, but that, on the contrary, it would be said, that my forbearance was evidence of my having made a bargain, though unwilling to execute it. ‘Your enemies have sought, by previous denunciation, to frighten you. They do not believe that you have acted otherwise than from motives of the purest patriotism; but they wish to alarm you, and prevent you from entering the department of state.’ These, and other similar arguments were pressed on me, and after a week’s deliberation, I yielded to their force. It is quite possible, that I may have erred. . . . I shall at least have no cause of self-reproach.”

In the end, it seemingly was a mistake, by both Adams and Clay, with the latter’s career forever marred, and Adams’ presidency off on the wrong foot from the start, with this scandal, as mentioned, also serving as the first salvo against Adams’ in his subsequent run for a second term as President, although as we’ll get into momentarily in the Bonus Facts along with the story of Andrew Jackson killing a man he deemed needed killing, “run” is slightly a misnomer. Adams seemed to actively and purposefully forgo doing anything that might see him re-elected to a second term.

But to sum up, while it’s impossible to know for sure if Adams and Clay had made any such deal, all evidence seems to be that the story circulated by Andrew Jackson was false, with all of the principal actors in the thing being Jackson supporters, and all of them, except Jackson himself, denied that any such corrupt bargain had occurred between Adams and Clay. And, indeed, ironically, they implicated themselves in trying to insinuate such a bargain with Clay instead, with others noting that the Jackson camp had indeed tried this tack with Clay and his supporters.

As for Clay, while having issues with Adams, he very explicitly had much greater issues with Andrew Jackson. Thus, could not have switched his support to Jackson without losing an incredible amount of credibility amongst his peers, and the idea that they, too, would suddenly switch to the Jackson camp if he had seems unlikely.

Adams, on the other hand, had been groomed to be President practically from birth. In choosing between the two, it’s really not surprising at all that members of the House who were well aware of Jackson’s inexperience and extremely volatile temperament would largely go for the calm and collected Adams who’d trained his whole life to be President. Further, with each state only getting 1 vote, Jackson was no longer taking advantage of the 3/5 compromise that allowed for more votes because of the slaves in most of his support states. And as for Clay’s eventual selection as Secretary of State, he was seemingly just the best suited candidate for the job so Adams picked him for it regardless of what anyone else thought.

Jackson’s story did its work, however. Clay could not prove a negative, and Jackson supporters never let it go. While it didn’t win Jackson the 1824 election, it unequivocally helped take down his two greatest potential opponents in the following one, as well as garnered sympathy for Jackson- a man of the people simply fighting against the corruption of more established aristocratic politicians who lie to the public’s face while making back alley deals for their own benefit. With the Jackson camp ironically helping to win Jackson the Presidency by lying to the publcis’ face and trying, and failing, to make a back alley deal for their own benefit.

Bonus Facts:

We’ll get to Jackson murdering a man momentarily, but going back to the 1828 election Adams lost to Jackson, it should be noted that Adams didn’t exactly try to win… Like at all really… with Adams more or less refusing to campaign in any way which had been more the norm before this, but politics were changing. Adams simply refused to change with the times on this matter. Even largely ignoring campaigning via public functions, perhaps not a surprise for a man who disliked socializing to an extreme degree. For example, when asked to come do some politicking while helping to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Bunker Hill, he nixed the idea. Later, given he could speak German and spent significant time in the region as an ambassador, he was also encouraged to go open a canal in a German speaking area of Pennsylvania to help boost his standing there, something he likewise declined stating, “This mode of electioneering suited neither my taste nor my principles.”

In yet another invite to press the flesh at a major agricultural fair in Baltimore, he once again declined, stating if he accepted, it would just encourage more such events. He states, “From cattle-shows to other public meetings for purposes of utility or exposure of public sentiment, the transition is natural and easy. This is no part of my duty.” He further went on, “My journeys and my visits, wherever they may be, shall have no connection with the Presidency.”

On all this, his refusal to go out campaigning directly, as well as his refusal to directly address the accusations against him by his opponent and co., left many of those closest to him extremely frustrated. This was, in some respects, a quite simple man who, for example, when left to his own devices despite being relatively well off often ate plain crackers for meals instead of fancy dinners, and who one of his favorite activities was to sit at home by himself and study his Bible- things which contrasted sharply with the elitist, corrupt, aristocratic “professor” version of Adams that Jackson’s supporters pushed. Given this, the person who knew him best, his wife Louisa, lamented, “If he would only lend himself a little to the usages and manners of the people without hiding himself and… rejecting their civilities, no man could be more popular because his manners are simple, unostentatious, and unassuming.”

That said, all was not bad on the John Quincy Adams side. Seemingly never having enjoyed being President, and fairly ineffectual in the role, he found his stride once again as a member of Congress becoming the first President to serve in Congress after being President, and still the only one to serve in the House of Representatives after holding the nation’s highest office- both things U.S. history after should be very grateful for. If John Quincy Adams’ Presidency was relatively unremarkable, his time in Congress after was not, though much of what he advocated would, as alluded to earlier, be accomplished by his successors, such as Abraham Lincoln adopting many of the arguments Adams used when trying to put an end to slavery in the United States.

In the end, slavery became the area Adams’ focussed on the most in the waning years of his political life, notably also along with fighting for women’s rights and Native Americans- all things which in his era generally weren’t exactly highly praised, but have seen historians today view his work outside of his Presidency much more favorably in retrospect. As for the slavery question, he stated it was his goal to “bring about a day prophesied when slavery and war shall be banished from the face of the Earth”.

Speaking of Lincoln, he is often credited as a Congressional pallbearer at Adams’ funeral but when really digging into it, evidence seems to be that in reality John Wentworth represented Illinois in this role. That said, Lincoln was a freshman Congressman at the time of Adams’ death and, like Adams at that time, a Whig. Perhaps unsurprisingly from this, as just noted, Lincoln embraced many of Adams’ ideas on this front in trying to rid the nation of slavery. For example, Adams argued that the Declaration of Independence was a foundational document defining the United States every bit as much as the Constitution. This was an important supposition, as Adams’ stated, “The fault is in the Constitution of the United States, which has sanctioned a dishonorable compromise with slavery.” Whereas the Declaration of Independence, in strong contrast, states very clearly “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Not just pushing the Declaration of Independence and its ideas as guiding and core principles of the nation, Adams also claimed in a speech he gave on July 4th, 1837, “The inconsistency of the institution of domestic slavery with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, was seen and lamented by all the southern patriots of the Revolution; by no one with deeper and more unalterable conviction, than by the author of the Declaration himself.”

Going further on the hypocrisy, he wrote back in 1820, “The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret of their souls. In the abstract they admit that slavery is an evil, they disclaim it, and cast it all upon the shoulder of Great Britain. But when probed to the quick upon it, they show at the bottom of their souls pride and vain glory in their condition of masterdom. They look down upon the simplicity of a Yankee’s manners, because he has no habits of overbearing like theirs and cannot treat negroes like dogs. It is among the evils of slavery that it taints the very sources of moral principle. It establishes false estimates of virtue and vice: for what can be more false and heartless than this doctrine which makes the first and holiest rights of humanity to depend upon the color of the skin?”

Another method of attack against slavery Adams pushed was to try to not allow its spread any further into new territories. In this way, inevitably the non-slave regions would come to dominate the political discourse of the nation over time. Of course, in the end, Adams well knew that the issues of slavery could well split the nation he loved and had dedicated his life to. Nevertheless, he championed the cause, stating, “if the dissolution of the Union must come, let it come from no other cause but this.”

In all this, while he may have been the wrong man at the wrong time during his presidency, he was unequivocally the right man at the right time afterwards in this fight. His age and popularity among those electing him to Congress basically set in stone allowing him the freedom to do and say whatever he wished without too much concern. Further, his extreme stubbornness and willingness to advocate for what he felt was right regardless of what anyone else thought or who he pissed off, as well as general attitude of if you push him, he will push back with extreme vigor, also proved a huge boon. On this note, over the course of his time fighting to end slavery in the United States, including defending the captives from the famed 1841 United States v. The Amistad before the Supreme Court, correspondents indicating he’d soon be murdered became something of a regular occurance for Adams, such as one that stated, “You will when least expected, be shot down in the street, or your damaged guts will be cut out in the dark.”

Yet while these often caused others who knew him a great deal of anxiety, Adams himself generally seemed little concerned and simply kept fighting the fight regardless. In the end, all resulting in one Virginian slave holder lamenting that Adams was, as previously noted, the “acutest, the astutest, the archest enemy of Southern slavery that ever existed.”

Or, as the aforementioned Adams Family Papers Editor, Margaret A. Hogan, would sum up, “The same high-minded and rigidly uncompromising stance on moral issues that so weakened his effectiveness as a President served him well as a representative in Congress. In taking up the battle against slavery, Adams greatly redeemed himself in the eyes of history…”

Going back to Andrew Jackson and his killing a man he deemed needed killing. On May 30, 1806, Andrew Jackson dueled with famed marksman Charles Dickinson, killing him, after Dickinson insulted Jackson in a variety of ways including calling Jackson’s wife of bigamist, as previously noted.

As to what caused him to insult Jackson and his wife, both Dickinson’s father-in-law and Jackson at the time were horse breeders and rivals of one another. The beef between the two that eventually escalated to Jackson challenging Dickinson to a duel started in 1805 when Jackson had a $2000 (about $35,000 today) bet with Captain Joseph Erwin, Dickinson’s father-in-law, on a horse race. The winner would get $2,000 from the other, or if the horse one or the other bet on couldn’t run, then that person would have to pay the other $800. Erwin’s horse did indeed not run the race, having come up lame, while Jackson’s horse Truxton did run, and so Erwin was forced to pay Jackson $800, though there was a disagreement between the two about which notes Jackson would be paid with.

Later Dickinson overheard a secondhand account of things Jackson supposedly said about Erwin over the matter and became angry at Jackson about it and fought with the person telling the story, who was a friend of Jackson. Dickinson then sent Thomas Swann to ask Jackson whether what he heard was true, which Jackson denied, but in the process Jackson physically attacked Swann and said he was a “stupid meddler”.

Dickinson then wrote to Jackson, calling him a “coward and an equivocator”. This escalated to the point where the two were sending a series of insults back and forth, including publishing some in the National Review, such as this last one which was the final straw, published in May of 1806 by Dickinson calling Jackson a “worthless scoundrel, … a poltroon and a coward” after Jackson had called Dickinson a “a worthless, drunken, blackguard”.

Despite the fact that Dickinson was known to be one of the best marksmen in all of Tennessee and dueling was illegal in that state, Jackson challenged him to a duel by sending him a note stating, he wanted “satisfaction due [him] for the insults offered.” Because dueling was illegal in Tennessee, they traveled to Logan, Kentucky, and dueled on the shores of the Red River.

Jackson conceded the first shot to Dickinson, choosing not to fire when he turned, even though Dickinson was such a good marksmen. He and his second thought there was a chance Dickinson might miss, having to turn and shoot and trying to do so as quickly as possible before Jackson could get off a shot. So if he did miss or otherwise dealt a non-fatal blow, Jackson could then take his time and aim and kill him with the one shot he was allowed, as Dickinson would be required to stand still and give Jackson his chance. Things didn’t go quite as smoothly as hoped, as the shot fired by Dickinson hit Jackson in the chest just a few inches from his heart, breaking two ribs in the process.

Not to be dissuaded, Jackson stayed on his feet and carefully aimed at Dickinson and pulled the trigger… only nothing happened as the hammer had stopped half-cocked. So he re-cocked it and pulled the trigger again, this time hitting Dickinson in the chest.

A few hours later Dickinson died as Jackson’s shot had damaged an artery. He was only 26 years old leaving his wife a widow, all over her father’s honor. All things being equal, we imagine Captain Erwin would have rather his daughter still had her promising young husband around, but who’s to say. It’s also interesting to think how markedly different history might have been if Dickinson’s shot had been just an inch or two closer to Jackson’s heart.

Whatever the case, Jackson lived on and eventually became President, although because of the bullet’s proximity to his heart, it could not be removed and remained in his chest for the remaining 39 years of his life, reportedly causing him quite a bit of pain. Asked after the fact how he kept his feet after a near deadly hit to the chest, Jackson replied, “I should have hit him if he had shot me through the brain.”

This duel didn’t endear people to Jackson as many thought it was dishonorable for him to aim to kill after Dickinson had already taken his shot, thinking Jackson should have instead simply aimed to hurt Dickinson instead or even that he should have fired in the air to spare his life, thus ending the duel. But let’s just say, with a long track record in it, mercy upon anyone who he perceived had slighted him in any way wasn’t exactly in Jackson’s character.

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